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Abstract  
China’s huge domestic market is constantly expanding, and is low-end demand 
oriented and highly dispersed. The domestic market-based development of China’s 
industrial cluster, however, is not only a quantitative expansion, but has also been 
accompanied with remarkable qualitative upgrading. Specialized markets are a 
microcosm that clearly indicate this paradoxical phenomenon. By analyzing three 
typical cases of industrial clusters that have specialized markets, this paper will 
make the case that under modern China’s market conditions, the local public sector 
is the crucial driving force for upgrading industrial clusters, which organize 
complicated transactions, promote quality control, and stimulate the division of 
labor. 
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1. Introduction1 
This paper will discuss the relationship between industrial clusters and market 
conditions. By inserting Global Value Chains (GVCs), many industrial clusters in 
developing countries have realized a remarkable development in the field of production 
management and quality control2. It must be noted that the unique market conditions 
in developed countries directly support this upgrading pattern3. Because the majority 
of their society is middle class, the demand in the markets of developed countries  is 
more sophisticated, rapidly changing and high-quality oriented. On the other hand, 
due to the existence of powerful companies, the production and distribution of products 
within these markets are better organized. Corresponding to the advance of 
globalization, these companies tend to govern worldwide production and distribution. 
The essence of the GVC approach can be understood as a thinking that attempts to 
obtain development opportunities from such unique markets. 
In modern China, a large number of SMEs in industrial clusters have rapidly 
developed within the domestic market. However, China’s market conditions seem to be 
quite different from developed countries. The scale of this market ballooned during a 
very short period, but the majority of Chinese society is still lower class. Furthermore, 
there are no powerful companies or social intermediate organizations that are able to 
organize production or distribution within such a huge market. Under these market 
conditions, as common sense dictates, intense price competition will take place more 
readily than the competition characterized by quality control, brand management, or 
R&D.  
However, a few studies have indicated the domestic market-based industrial cluster 
                                                  
1 This paper is a midterm report of IDE’s research project titled “the Flowchart 
Approach to the Formation of Industrial Clusters: Focusing on the Mechanism of 
Endogenous R&D and Innovation.” 
2 See Global Value Chain Initiative website: http://www.globalvaluechains.org 
(accessed October 2, 2006). 
3 The ideas behind this paper were influenced by the concept of the National Chain 
(Hubert Schmitz 2005, 2006a, b). Value chain approach is quite useful in analyzing the 
business linkages between various companies within an industry. However, as this 
paper will mention the market conditions, which include the market structure (the 
number of companies), the size and the quality of demand in a market, the framework 
for the value chain approach will not be applied here. 
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development in China is not only a quantitative expansion, but that it has also been 
accompanied by a qualitative upgrading (Sonobe and Otsuka 2004; Jin 2003)4. Why 
were these clusters able to develop under such market conditions? To answer this 
question, the mechanism that China’s industrial clusters responded to, its domestic 
market, must be investigated. Moreover, the feature of China’s domestic market must 
be further clarified.  
As the features of various industries are quite different, this paper explores the 
above question through the following three cases. All of the industrial clusters in these 
cases have surprisingly upgraded within the domestic market. 
The first case is China’s largest industrial cluster for daily necessities. Because of 
the huge size of the domestic market, the demand for the products of this industry is 
more varied than for that of others. This requires higher skills to deal with the 
complicated transactions5. We are going to explore who played the substitutive role, 
without a powerful buyer that can organize a large number of commodities in a 
well-ordered way. 
The second case is China’s largest industrial cluster for eyewear. As a commodity 
that affects human health, the requirements for quality in the eyewear industry are 
much higher than in other industries. Our question is, in a market where the price 
competition is more general, without any social intermediate organizations or 
companies that are able to constantly put the pressure from consumers on the small 
producers, who promoted the progress in quality? 
The third case is China’s largest industrial cluster for moulds. As typical of 
supporting industries, cost is a key factor in upgrading the mould industry. Our 
                                                  
4 Sonobe and Otsuka (2004) argued China’s industrial clusters qualitatively upgraded 
in the third stage of China’s development. However, their basic assumption is that 
except for some leading companies, most of the SMEs had gone out of business before 
this stage. In contrast, we are asserting that even after the second stage, a large 
number of SMEs survived and developed. This paper focuses on the institutional 
factors that facilitated the development of these SMEs. 
5 It is noteworthy that the SMEs which produce various types of daily necessities 
usually geographically clustered in a same space. Thus, how to deal with the 
complicated transactions of these daily necessities is a key factor in upgrading the 
daily necessities related clusters. 
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question is, without a powerful producer who provides raw materials, machines, and 
maintains the subcontract production system, who supported the small producers, 
allowing them to survive the price competition? 
As for the rest of this paper, section 2 introduces the Specialized Market as a unique 
viewpoint for helping us to observe China’s industrial clusters. Section 3, 4, and 5 
investigate the above three industries from the viewpoint of the specialized market. 
We state our conclusions at the end. 
 
2. Brief Introduction to the Specialized Market 
This paper discusses the above issue from the viewpoint of the specialized market6. 
As a unique space in most of the important industrial clusters in China, the specialized 
market is quite useful to our analysis. 
 
Table 1 Scope of Specialized Markets in Zhejiang’s Major Industrial Clusters (1998) 
Market 
scope 
Withi
n the 
city 
Beyond the 
city but 
within 
Zhejiang  
Beyond 
Zhejiang but 
within the 
domestic 
market 
Other 
developin
g 
countries
Developed 
countries  
Unknown
No. of 
markets 
5 1 45 21 15 15 
Source: Ding (2006a, Chapter 1). The original source is ZPMCC Committee (2000). 
 
Firstly, the commodities of specialized markets are mainly distributed in the 
domestic market7. Table 1 shows the scope of 68 specialized markets within 53 typical 
industrial clusters in Zhejiang province, where the specialized markets and the 
industrial clusters first appeared and are the most developed. As this table clearly 
shows, in 1998, among 68 markets, there are 45 markets that sell commodities to 
China’s domestic market8. 
                                                  
6 This paper defines specialized markets as wholesale markets located in industrial 
clusters, and dealing with the related commodities of the local industry. 
7 As for the reason why specialized markets have a strong ability to explore China’s 
domestic market, see (Ding 2006b). 
8 It is interesting that some markets have linkages with overseas markets. There are 
 5
Secondly, the structure of the specialized market is highly dispersed. As Table 2 
indicates, among 68 markets in Zhejiang, at least 56 markets have no less than 100 
booths. Of these, 14 markets have between 1,000 and 4,999 booths, and 7 markets 
have no less than 5,000 booths. Needless to say, most of the booth keepers engage in 
the related businesses of the local industries, including both in the commercial sector 
and in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Table 2 Number of Booths in Specialized Markets in Zhejiang’s Major Industrial 
Clusters (1998) 
No. of booths 100-999 1000-4999 No less than 
5000 
Unknown 
No. of markets 35 14 7 12 
Source: Ding (2006a, Chapter 1). The original source is ZPMCC Committee (2000). 
 
On the other hand, there are also a large number of buyers who make purchases in 
the specialized markets. According to limited data, among Zhejiang’s above-mentioned 
68 markets, there are 2 markets which have 100,000 buyers visiting per day 9 . 
Additionally, there are 5 markets which 50,000, 15,000, 10,000, 8,000 and 50 
merchants, respectively, visit per day10. We can infer that no one company is able to 
control others under this market structure.  
Thirdly, the specialized market developed simultaneously with the industrial cluster. 
Table 3 indicates the trend for the growth of markets in Zhejiang province. This table’s 
data consists of both the markets linked to industrial clusters and the markets that do 
not have such linkage. We can observe a rough trend in both the number of markets 
and the transaction volume of these markets: both increased rapidly during the period 
from 1979 to 1998. After 1998, although the number of markets decreased, the 
transaction volume continued to expand. This means that after a period of competition, 
                                                                                                                                                  
21 markets that sell commodities to developing countries, and 15 markets that sell 
commodities to developed countries. The specialized market seems to be superior at 
exploring the developing countries’ low-end market. 
9 This is the number in the maximum. 
10 This is the number in the maximum. 
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some markets disappeared, but the scale of others grew larger. 
 
Table 3 Development of Transaction Markets in Zhejiang 
Year No. of markets 
Transaction volume 
(100 million Yuan) 
Comparison with the transaction 
volume of Zhejiang’s social 
consumer commodities 
1979 1322 11.3 0.192：1 
1984 2241 26.9 0.214：1 
1990 3797 162 0.458：1 
1995 4349 2165.7 1.634：1 
1998 4619 3209 1.681：1 
2001 4278 4652 1.820：1 
Source: Ding (2006a, Chapter 1). The original source is Jin (2003). 
Notes： 
* Comparison with the transaction volume of Zhejiang’s social consumer commodities  
=Transaction volume of transaction market in Zhejiang: Total retail amount of 
Zhejiang’s social consumer commodities 
 
Table 4 indicates this trend more clearly. It shows that among Zhejiang’s 68 
specialized markets, at least 36 markets have been extended or relocated. Of these, 21 
markets have been extended or relocated multiple times. As a market is extended or 
relocated only when its business scale has drastically expanded, we can confirm that 
specialized markets developed constantly with the industrial cluster. 
 
Table 4 Times of Extension or Relocation of Specialized Markets in Zhejiang’s Major 
Industrial Clusters (1998） 
Times 0 1 No 
less 
than 1 
2 No 
less 
than 
2 
3 No less 
than 3 
No 
less 
than 
4 
Has 
the 
plan 
Unknown 
No. of 
markets 
12 10 5 6 2 9 1 3 2 19 
Source: Ding (2006a, Chapter 1). The original source is ZPMCC Committee (2000). 
Based on the above analysis, we can confirm that specialized markets are just a 
microcosm of China’s domestic market. In order to understand the domestic 
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market-based development of industrial clusters in China, the features of specialized 
markets and their role in regards to the SMEs in industrial clusters must be clarified. 
 
Table 5 Organizations in Charge of the Construction and Management of Specialized 
Markets in Zhejiang’s Major Industrial Clusters (1998) 
Organizatio
ns 
AIC V TG CG1 CG2 G+G G +P G→P P Unknow
n  
No. of 
markets 
6 5 1 2 1 14 5 4 5 25 
Source: Ding (2006a, Chapter 1). Original source is ZPMCC Committee (2000). 
Notes： 
AIC: Administration for Industry and Commerce (Gongshang);  
V: Village;  
TG: Town Government;  
CG1: County Government;  
CG2: City Government;  
G+G: Multiple local governments or government departments jointly establishing a 
market; 
G+P: Local governments and private firms jointly establishing a market; 
G→P: Local government transferred authority to private firms after establishing and 
managing a market for some time;  
P: Private firms. 
 
Compared to transaction markets in other developing countries, the high 
intervention of the public sector can be pointed out as the most characteristic feature of 
the specialized market11. As Table 5 indicates, among Zhejiang’s above-mentioned 68 
markets, there are at least 38 markets where the local public sector is or has been in 
charge of the construction and transaction management for the market. Only 5 
                                                  
11 The reason why China’s local public sector is so active to intervene in the local 
economic development is an important theme that requires separate study. We just 
point out that modern China’s unique fiscal system is a key factor in understanding 
this question. 
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markets have been managed by private firms from the beginning. Usually, the local 
public sector intervenes in a specialized market by establishing a managing committee 
composed of some local government employees. Thus, the study of industrial cluster 
development within the domestic market is essentially the study of the role of 
managing committees in the development of specialized markets and the impact on 
industrial clusters. 
 
3. Yiwu: A Case Study of a Daily Necessity Cluster 
3.1 Brief Introduction to Yiwu12 
Yiwu is the world’s largest production and distribution center of daily necessities. 
This city was a proper rural area at the end of the 1970s. However, after the local 
government established a wholesale market—Yiwu China Commodity City (Yiwu 
Market)13—in 1982, Yiwu started its rapid economic growth. During the period from 
1982 to 1990, accompanying the increase in the number of booths in Yiwu Market from 
700 to 8,000, 180 “One village one product” appeared consequently. After the 1990s, the 
number of booths in the Yiwu Market increased further. Moreover, this market began 
to export overseas from the end of the 1990s. As a result, no less than eight large 
industrial clusters were formed within Yiwu for, in particular, socks, shirts, wool, 
accessories, zippers, toys, key sticks and printing (Ding 2006a, Chapter 4). The major 
companies in these clusters are modern mass-production factories. Currently, the Yiwu 
Market has over 400,000 commodities in 1,901 categories from 43 industries. Its 
commodities are distributed in not only China’s domestic market, but also in 212 
countries and regions in the world market (ZCCC Group 2006). 
 
 
                                                  
12 As for the details of the development of the Yiwu Market, see Lu, Bai, Wang (2003), 
Ding (2006b). 
13 Yiwu Market is one of Zhejiang’s above-mentioned 68 markets. 
 9
Figure 1. Changes in the Industrial Structure of Yiwu City (percent). 
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Source: Lu, Bai, Wang (2003). The original source is Yiwu Statistics. ed. (1978-2002). 
 
It is clear that the development of the Yiwu Market directly stimulated the 
industrial cluster formation in Yiwu. This market played a crucial role in 1992 in 
particular. As Figure 1 indicates, despite the appearance of “one village one products,” 
the tertiary sector of Yiwu continued to expand until this year. After that, however, the 
secondary sector suddenly started its remarkable growth. 
Ding (2006a, Chapter 4) has pointed out this transformation was caused by the 
structural changes that had taken place in the Yiwu Market during the period from 
1992 to 1997. In concrete terms, 1) a large number of merchants from other regions 
began operating in the Yiwu Market; 2) the number of comparatively educated and 
young merchants increased in the Yiwu Market; and 3) the booth keepers in the Yiwu 
Market gradually built long-term business relationships with the makers. To fully 
explain, the situation in the Yiwu Market that caused these changes in 1992 must be 
clarified.  
 
3.2 Classification of Commodities  
Mr. He Zhangxing is one of the key persons for understanding the situation in 1992. 
 10
At that time, he was in charge of the AIC (Administration for Industry and Commerce) 
office, which is a major member of the managing committee for the Yiwu Market14. 
According to Mr. He, the classification of commodities in the Yiwu Market was very 
rough in 1991. In 1990, the 8,000 booths in the market were only divided into four 
industries: daily necessities, garments, knitwear, and shoes15. Although all of the 
commodities were assigned to be placed in specific spaces by the industries, one could 
easily find the same type of commodity in any other commodity’s space. For some 
booths, once the booth keeper was changed, the commodities of the booth would also 
change. Some small merchants who did not have stable relationships with the makers 
also changed their businesses often. As a result, the same type of commodities had at 
times quite different prices in different places of the Market. It is easy to imagine that 
in this chaotic situation the formation of industrial clusters with the establishment of 
mass-production factories was very difficult. 
Consequently, in 1991 when the Yiwu Market planned to build a new generation 
market16, Mr. He was confronted with a great hurdle in his efforts to design an 
efficient way to classify by industry and location the large quantities and types of 
commodities of the Yiwu Market (Hua Hang Gui Shi). For this purpose, Mr. He and his 
colleagues visited numerous department and hardware stores to learn methods of 
classifying commodities by use, raw material, and configuration, etc. In 1992, they 
were able to work out a plan to classify the Yiwu Market into eight zones, where the 
commodities of 16 industries could be bought and sold. These industries were 1.) 
garments, 2.) knitwear, 3.) shoes, 4.) socks, 5.) ribbons, 6.) wool yarn, 7.) small 
hardware, 8.) decorations, 9.) daily necessities, 10.) rainwear, bags and suitcases, 11.) 
stationery and sports goods, 12.) cosmetics and other pharmaceutical goods, 13.) 
buttons, zippers, and other accessories, 14.) toys, 15.) lighters, watches and electronics, 
                                                  
14 The record of the interview with Mr. He Zhangxin is based mainly on Xinhuanet 
(2006). In the following paragraphs on the Yiwu Market, sources were only written 
when being cited from other sources. 
15 YYLGE Office (1992) 
16 The regular Yiwu Market was originally built in 1982. After that, as business 
expanded and infrastructure and other constraints were felt, a new generation 
market was built in place of the original. New generations replaced the earlier ones 
periodically. The fourth generation market was built in 1991. 
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and 16.) artificial flowers17.  
Before moving into the new market, the AIC asked every booth keeper to register 
their business and obtain a license18, as the first step to carrying out the above plan. 
However, there was no reaction from the booth keepers in the first three days. Many 
booth keepers worried their profits would decrease due to the scope of their businesses 
being limited by the registration. In order to solve this problem, Mr. He and his 
colleagues approached some of the leaders of the merchants of the Yiwu Market, 
particularly those in the Communist party. In the end, most of the booth keepers were 
registered. 
After the fourth-generation market was opened, the AIC continued to take flexible 
measures in promoting the classification of commodities19. During the first month, 
they permitted all merchants, registered or not, to enter the new market. From the 
second month, they began permitting the resale or exchange of booth licenses. The AIC 
required all the booth keepers to show their license in the Market from the third 
month. 
Then, the effect of the classification was gradually felt by most of the merchants. For 
example, in the third-generation market, the transaction scale for artificial flowers and 
shoes was very small. In the fourth-generation market, however, because the same 
types of booths were collected in the same areas, their existence became increasingly 
noticeable. The number of shoes booths increased from 220 to 1,700 during the period 
from 1990 to 199220. The booth keepers of artificial flowers developed more than one 
type of new product almost every day.  
In 2006, Mr. He looked back on the commodity classification and declared it to have 
the following three merits.  
Firstly, by collecting booths that dealt with the same commodities into the same 
areas, competition increased. As a result, the merchants in the Yiwu Market were 
                                                  
17 The data of the classification plan in 1992 is cited from Zhang and others (1993). 
18 Mr. He did not explain clearly about registration. It is estimated that the business 
scope of booths was not strictly fixed until this time. 
19 They allocated the newly built booths to more than 13,000 merchants by lottery. 
20 The number of shoe booths in 1990 is cited from the YYLGE Office (1992). 
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strongly stimulated to develop newer and better commodities. Although Mr. He did not 
point this out, the increase of better-educated and younger merchants in the Yiwu 
Market during the period from 1992 to 1997 can be inferred as a result of this 
situation. 
Secondly, the classification of commodities stimulated the merchants to specialize in 
specific fields (so that their businesses become more stable). It is easy to infer that 
small merchants in the Yiwu Market were able to build long-term business 
relationships with makers due just to this reason. 
Thirdly, classification enabled the extension of the Market. In 1994, the Yiwu 
Market was enlarged again. The new market was classified into 13 zones, where the 
commodities of 21 industries were bought and sold21. Currently, as mentioned above, 
there are over 400,000 commodities in 1,901 categories from 43 industries. The 
number of booths increased to 580,000. It is clear that a large number of merchants 
from other regions relocated to the Yiwu Market just due to this situation. 
Needless to say, the above three points on the classification of commodities are the 
most powerful explanation of the development of the Yiwu Market and Yiwu’s 
industrial clusters. This classification of commodities within the Yiwu Market seems to 
have had a broad influence. In 1998, among Zhejiang’s above-mentioned 68 specialized 
markets, there are at least 18 markets where the commodities were classified by 
industry and location. Of these, the transaction volumes of five markets amounted to 
100-1,000 million Yuan. The transaction volumes of 13 markets were no less than 1 
trillion Yuan. We can observe a clear correlation between the transaction scale and the 
classification of commodities. 
 
4 Danyang: A Case Study of an Eyewear Cluster 
4.1 The Profile of Danyang Cluster22 
                                                  
21 1994’s data is cited from ZPZHD Committee (1997). 
22 The profile of the Danyang Cluster is mainly based on Xu Yuanming and Xu 
Zhiming (2005). The author partially joined in their fieldwork. The author has also 
done his own fieldwork in Danyang separately since 2001. In the following 
paragraphs on the profile of the Danyang Cluster, sources are only written when 
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Dangyang is a county-level city, located in Zhenjiang city, Jiangsu Province. This city 
is one of the largest eyewear industrial clusters in China23. Its eyewear industry 
started in the period from the 1930s to the 1940s, when peasants living in the 
countryside of Danyang moved to Shanghai and Suzhou. These peasants worked at the 
eyewear factories as apprentices. At the beginning of the 1960s, some of these peasants 
returned to Danyang and began the production of lens, frames and screws. After that, 
a few eyewear factories appeared in Danyang. In 1985, the number of township 
eyewear factories amounted to 23. The total production volume of these factories 
increased to 4,563,100 pairs of glasses and 2,592,500 pairs of frames, which accounted 
for one third of the total in China’s domestic market.  
The Danyang Eyewear Cluster continued its growth through the whole of the 1980s 
and the 1990s. In 2004, the total production amount of Danyang eyewear increased to 
3 trillion Yuan, of which the export of eyewear amounts to more than 100 million 
dollars. The number of workers in the eyewear industry increased to 50,000. More 
than 1,000 factories and trading companies have appeared in this cluster. Of these, 
more than 400 are frame makers, more than 70 are CR-39 plastic lens makers, more 
than 100 are glass lens makers, more than 20 are screw makers, more than 20 are 
spectacle case makers, and 500 are trading companies and other supporting companies. 
The domestic share of the plastic lenses of Danyang has increased to more than 70%. 
The world share of glass lenses and plastic lenses of Danyang amounts to 80% and 50% 
respectively24. 
Danyang Optical Market (Danyang Market) is China’s largest optical market, and 
has played a crucial role in the development of Danyang’s eyewear cluster25. In the 
1970s, a small market for exchanging eyewear products was spontaneously formed 
                                                                                                                                                  
being cited from other authors. 
23 Other typical eyewear clusters are the Duqiao Cluster and the Wenzhou Cluster in 
Zhejiang province, and the Shenzhen Cluster in Guangdong province. 
24 The Data for domestic and world share are cited from the Danyang Optical 
Chamber of Commerce (2005).  
25 Danyang Cluster is located in the south part of Jiangsu province. This area’s 
pattern of industrialization is similar to the northeast part of Zhejiang (Ding2006a, 
Chapater1). Thus, the basic features of the specialized market in Zhejiang derived 
from the above 68 markets can be applied to this market as well. 
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around Danyang station. The Danyang city government, the department of AIC, and 
the village near the station jointly established the formal Danyang Optical Market in 
1982. This market was opened in 1986. At the beginning, the number of booths in this 
market was merely 35. After several extensions, however, the total number of booths 
increased to more than 700 in 2003. In the same year, the transaction volume of this 
market amounted to 620 million Yuan. Almost all eyewear related goods, including 
lenses, frames, parts, and measurement instruments are sold in this market. 
It was very interesting that at the first stage in 1987, the glass lenses in the 
Danyang Market were mainly produced in other parts of Jiangsu province. The share 
of all the eyewear-related commodities made in Danyang was only 25%. However, after 
starting business in this market, more than 200 booth keepers gradually began 
opening their factories in 2002. Many local makers tended to make use of this market 
as well. As a result, the local share of lenses and frames in the Danyang Market 
increased to 80% and 70% respectively in 200226. The factors that caused such a 
structural change must be clarified. 
 
4.2 Upgrading Quality Control27 
It is well known that the quality of glasses directly affects the health of one’s eyes. 
Even though the majority of China’s domestic market is lower class, the consumers are 
more sensitive to eyewear quality than to that of any other product. Thus, progress in 
the quality of eyewear is the most important factor necessary in understanding the 
above structural change. 
In Danyang, the turning point was 1995, when domestic consumers still accounted 
for the absolute majority. Zhongguo Zhiliang Wanlixing (ZZW) is a social movement 
that started in 1992. It was facilitated by China’s central government, major mass 
                                                  
26 This paragraph is based on the author’s interview with a booth keeper in the 
Danyang Market in 2002. 
27 This part is mainly based on the author’s interview with the person in charge of the 
QC department of the Danyang Market in April 2001. In the following paragraphs 
on the QC in Danyang Market, sources are only written when being cited from other 
authors. 
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media, famous companies, scholars, and technologists28. In 1995, a few members of 
ZZW visited Danyang Market and inspected its eyewear. Their report indicated that 
the examination pass rate of glasses in this market was surprisingly zero29. CCTV and 
other major mass media outlets in China reported on this, and as a result, the 
Danyang Cluster’s image was greatly damaged. 
Under great social pressure, the government of Danyang and the managing 
committee of Danyang Market had to take drastic measures to cope with this quality 
problem. On August 8, 1996, they established a quality control (QC) department in 
Danyang Market. All the staff of this department came from the QC department of 
Danyang city. 
In September 1996, the QC department and members involved with the Danyang 
Market (including public security, the office for industry and commerce, the tax office, 
and the local media) inspected the quality of glasses of the Market again. They 
confirmed that the quality of Danyang glasses was indeed poor. The examination pass 
rate for lenses was merely 45%. For frames it was 60%. 
The QC department determined two reasons for the poor quality. The first reason 
was the poor quality control technology. It was estimated that 30% of the inferior goods 
were caused by this reason. For example, there were few booths in Danyang Market 
that met China’s National Glasses Lens Quality Standard of GB10180 at this time. 
Many booths did not even own the measuring instruments that are indispensable to 
the production and sale of lenses.  
In order to improve the poor QC technology, the QC department decided to visit all of 
the factories related to the Danyang Market yearly30. The QC staff usually check the 
production system thoroughly, explaining the problems to the factory owners in detail. 
In the case of lenses, the QC department required all of the booth-keepers who 
                                                  
28 This movement put emphasis on the exposure of imitation goods and goods with 
poor quality. In order to get the true information, the members of ZZW would usually 
visit a factory, a market, or a department store suddenly, thoroughly inspecting the 
quality of commodities in these places. The results were be reported to China’s major 
mass media outlets. 
29 According to the interviewee, most of the booths in this market closed their shops on 
this day. This data was based on the inspection results of merely three booths.  
30 Of course, their activity was limited to Danyang. 
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owned lens factories to introduce electric lens measuring instruments31. In 1996, the 
price of each instrument was 30,000 Yuan. In cases where the booth keeper was not 
able to afford the instrument, the QC department in the Danyang Market or the 
Danyang QC department, acting as a guarantor, would ask the measuring instrument 
agent in Danyang Market to accept postponement of payment. Sometimes, they even 
helped booth keepers in collecting debts from their customers.32  
The second reason for the poor quality was a lack of QC awareness. The QC 
department staff distinguished this point into two types. 
The first type is due to poor awareness of management. In concrete terms: 
1) Mistakenly putting product A into box B; 
2) Selling product A as product B in order to obtain a higher profit; 
3) Processing high quality lenses which were requested, in spite of the technological 
constraints, with poor quality raw material. 
The second type is an extreme lack of awareness of trademark rights. It was pointed 
out that there were only two trademarks in all of Danyang Market in 1996: Kangming 
and Huaguang33.  
Under these circumstances, the QC department took the following measures in 
improving the QC awareness of the booth keepers.  
Firstly, the QC department opened round-table talks with a number of booth keepers. 
In specialized markets, merchants are usually connected by relationships that are 
based on geographical origins. Thus, the QC department mainly invited the leaders of 
different regional merchant groups to attend this talk. The QC department staff tried 
to build a relationship of trust with those merchants first. After this, they explained to 
them the importance of QC. These talks lasted for 2 years in the Danyang Market.  
Secondly, the QC department opened QC publicity courses quarterly for all booth 
keepers in the Danyang Market. The tuition and textbook fees for this course were 
                                                  
31 Most of the instruments were made by the Japanese maker TOPCON. 
32 The person in charge of the QC department in the Danyang Market, who we 
interviewed, had helped 22 such booth keepers by 2001. 
33 The first is the brand of a Singaporean company. The second is the brand of a 
manufacturer in Hubei province, China. 
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free.  
Thirdly, the QC department advised all the booth keepers who owned factories to 
register their own trademarks. As a result, more than 400 booths had their own 
trademark by 2001. Some booths even had 5 or 6 trademarks.  
Besides the above measures, the QC department periodically supervised and 
inspected the booths. In 2001, lenses were inspected every month, frames every 6 
months, and the assembly of glasses every month34. In the case of inspections, the 
booth keepers are not informed of the inspection date in advance, and all of the 
products must be thoroughly examined. If quality problems are detected, the QC 
department will require the booth keeper to improve their quality. If quality problems 
are detected a second time, the booth’s information will be sent to the Danyang QC 
department. The offender will be punished with a fine of 10,000-100,000 Yuan. In some 
cases, the booth keeper is even forced to discontinue production.35 
In the Danyang Market, not only the QC department, but also other departments 
are in charge of the QC problem. For example, the AIC department puts stress on 
exposing imitation products. Its staff visit booths or other logistics points at random. If 
imitation goods are discovered, all the goods from that booth are confiscated. Then, the 
offender will be punished with a fine of from 10,000-100,000 Yuan36. 
The members of the managing committee of the Danyang Market sometimes jointly 
cope with the QC problem. Every year, a quality contest is held in the market under 
the sponsorship of the QC department, AIC, tax office, and the local village. The 
winner of this contest is given a certificate, which is displayed in a noticeable place in 
their booth. This certificate attracts consumers, as it is a guarantee of quality. This 
provides the booth keepers with a strong incentive for QC.  
Because of the effort of the members of the managing committee, the examination 
pass rate increasingly rose. In 1998, the examination pass rate for lenses was 85%, and 
                                                  
34 But the parts are not inspected. 
35 This information on punishment is based on an interview with a booth keeper in 
Danyang Market in April 2001. 
36 This information on the AIC is based on an interview with a booth keeper in the 
Danyang Market in April 2001. 
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89% for frames (JPZCCE Office 1999). In 2000, Danyang Market won the title of 
Jiangsu Shopping Rest Assured Specialized Market37. In April 2001, the examination 
pass rate of the top 406 booths of Danyang Market was 95% for lenses, 98% for 
frames 38 , and 59.8% for reading glasses. 39  The improvement in quality restored 
Danyang Market’s reputation. As a result, more and more eyewear merchants began to 
invest in the manufacturing sector. 
 
5 Yuyao: A Case Study of the Mould Industry 
5.1 Profile of Yuyao’s Mould Industry40 
Yuyao is a county-level city located in Ningbo, Zhejiang province. This city is one of 
the largest plastic products and mould clusters in China41. The origin of Yuyao’s plastic 
industry was in the 1960s when a few small Bakelite plastic factories made 
appearances in the city. Accompanying the development of the plastic industry, the 
demand for moulds rapidly increased. As a result, a large number of factories began to 
specialize in mould production in the 1980s. According to the China Die and Mould 
Association, in the mid-1980s, the capacity of Yuyao mould production and injection 
accounted for one fourth of all of China. Since that time, Yuyao has been called the 
“Home of Plastic” and the “Kingdom of Moulds”42. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, China Light Industry Association (CLIA) invested 
more than 30 million Yuan in Yuyao to build a model company named the Zhejiang 
Moulds Production Center (ZMPC). ZMPC received a complete suite of mould 
machines, with the capacity for integrated production. However, because the capacity 
                                                  
37 There were only 4 markets that won this title in Jiangsu Province. 
38 The remaining 2% are imitation goods. 
39 The rest of the booths’ glasses (the majority are sun glasses, reading glasses, and 
parts) were usually purchased from other eyewear clusters such as Wenzhou. The 
pass rate of these booths was 60%, which is still low. 
40 This part is mainly based on the author’s interview with the vice manager of the 
managing committee of the Yuyao Market and the vice president of the moulds 
association of Yuyao in July 2006. In the following paragraphs on the profile of 
Yuyao’s mould industry, sources are only written when being cited from other 
authors. 
41 Huangyan Cluster in Taizhou city, Zhejiang is also famous for its moulds industry. 
42 The information on China Die and Mould Association is cited from CPCIC (accessed 
January 17, 2007). 
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was not fully utilized and for other managerial reasons, this company soon went 
bankrupt. This left many skilled workers in Yuyao43.  
In order to sustain daily life, most of these workers started their own business. At 
this time, price competition was very intense. However, due to poor linkage with other 
firms and social intermediate organizations, these SMEs were not able to immediately 
obtain raw materials, or place orders with outside suppliers for parts for the 
manufacturing process to lower costs. Thus, they remained stagnant for a length of 
time. In order to give them the support required to survive this situation, the Yuyao 
government established a market specializing in moulds named China Light 
Industrial (Yuyao) Moulds City in 1995, in cooperation with CLIA44. The location of 
this market was decided to be an area where 150 of these SMEs informally clustered.  
After that, the SMEs in the moulds industry developed very rapidly. As indicated in 
Table 6, during the period from 2001 to 2005, the number of mould companies in Yuyao 
increased from more than 1,000 to more than 1,300, and the number of workers 
increased from more than 20,000 to more than 50,000. At the same time, mould 
production volume increased from 800 to 3,000 million Yuan. Except for the top 16 
companies, who export 70-80% of their products, most of the SMEs received orders 
from the domestic market. 
By comparing the number of mould companies in the Yuyao cluster and in the Yuyao 
Market, we can easily observe the correlation between the Yuyao Market and the 
development of Yuyao Mould Cluster. As Table 6 indicates, the number of newly 
started businesses in the Yuyao Market is larger than in the Yuyao Cluster. The 
number of companies in the Yuyao Market increased more rapidly. This means that 
besides the act that most of the newly started companies are located in the Yuyao 
Market, many outside companies have moved into this market too.  
                                                  
43 The information on ZMPC is partially cited from Shao and Ding (accessed January 
17, 2007). 
44 Yuyao Market is one of Zhejiang’s above-mentioned 68 markets. Because buyers 
usually go to this market and directly place orders, this area is treated as a 
specialized market in this paper. It must be noted that as most booth keepers 
produce moulds inside this market, sometimes the Yuyao Market is called an 
industrial zone.  
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 Table 6 Profile of the Yuyao Moulds Cluster 
   
Year 
Production volume 
in Yuyao Cluster 
(Million Yuan) 
No. of workers in 
Yuyao Cluster 
No. of 
companies in 
Yuyao Cluster 
No. of 
companies in 
Yuyao Market 
2001 800 More than 20000 More than 1000 220 
2002 1530 More than 30000 More than 1200 521 
2005 3000 More than 50000 More than 1300 658 
Sources:  
2001: CPCIC (accessed January 17, 2007); 
2002: Zhongguo qinggong moju wang (accessed January 17, 2007); 
2005: Gong and Wan (accessed January 17, 2007). 
 
5.2 Upgrading in the Production System 
The Yuyao Market is managed by a committee which has staff from Yuyao’s 
government as its members. By analyzing the activity of this committee, we can 
understand how the Yuyao Market upgraded the Yuyao cluster in detail 45. In concrete 
terms, this committee has taken following measures: 
Firstly, the managing committee built two raw material submarkets in the 1990s. 
They invited domestic and overseas raw material producers to setup their sales outlets 
within these markets. As Table7 indicates, during the period from 2001 to 2005, the 
number of raw material companies nearly doubled. The transaction volume and the 
weight of raw materials increased correspondingly. The price for China’s metal raw 
materials drastically increased during this period. However, because the clustering of 
companies offering the same products caused competition, the price of raw materials in 
Yuyao Market has risen no further than 1.1times. 
 
                                                  
45 This part is mainly based on the author’s interview with the vice manager of the 
managing committee and the vice president of the mould association of Yuyao in July 
2006. In the following paragraphs on the Yuyao Market, sources are only written 
when being cited from other authors. 
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Table 7 Raw Material Businesses in Yuyao Market 
Year No. of raw 
material 
companies 
Transaction volume 
of raw material 
(million Yuan) 
Weight of raw 
material 
(1000 t) 
2001 More than 40 More than 500 Less than 60 
2005 More than 80 More than 900 100 
Sources:  
2001: CPCIC (accessed January 17, 2007); 
2005: Gong and Wan (accessed January 17, 2007). 
 
Secondly, the managing committee has built a 5,000 square meter precision 
processing zone, at the cost of 50 million Yuan. They encouraged the top companies in 
Yuyao to put their unused machines in this zone so that the local SMEs could share the 
excess capacity46. On the other hand, students of local colleges can also make use of 
this precision processing zone as their training center. By 2006, more than 40 sets of 
machines had been introduced to this zone. 
Thirdly, the managing committee established a training center for skilled workers, 
in cooperation with the Baotou Technology College and the Yuyao education 
department. By September 2006, this center had trained more than 200 mould 
workers. It also has introduced 33 students who learned mould technology such as 
CAD/CAM in college47. 
Fourthly, the managing committee built a mould technology and machine exhibition 
center. More than 100 types of moulds from Yuyao’s top 12 companies and those of 
other SMEs are being exhibited in this center currently48. Since 1999, this center also 
                                                  
46 If there is only one of the machines in Yuyao, the zone will be used without requiring 
a fee, and the owner will receive subsidies. If there are no less than two of the same 
type of machine in Yuyao, the owner is required to pay a small fee for using the space. 
Of course, the SMEs must pay the rental fee. 
47 The details about the training center are cited from Gong and Wan (accessed 
January 17, 2007). 
48 The information on the usage of the exhibition center is cited from Gong and Wan 
(accessed January 17, 2007). 
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has held a yearly trade fair for moulds49. 
Fifthly, the managing committee established an information center in 2003, in 
cooperation with the science department of Zhejiang province. It also established its 
own website. By 2006, this center had accepted 133,200 members and announced more 
than 300,000 bits of information50. 
Sixthly, the managing committee established an inspection and measurement center, 
so that they would be able to provide authoritative reports to solve technological 
related problems. This center is in cooperation with the following two departments: 
1. The Weapon Science Academy Ningbo branch for analyzing the ingredients of 
metal materials; 
2. Yuyao QC center for measuring the length and cubic content of moulds. 
Seventhly, the managing committee established an R&D center for mould innovation 
in August 2006. Currently, it is in cooperation with the following three institutes: 
1. The Automobile Institute of Zhejiang University for the recommendation of new 
technologies; 
2. The Beijing Machinery Institute for the development of new software; 
3. The National Level Laboratory of Moulds in East China Science University for 
researching the fundamental theory of moulds.  
As stated above, the managing committee intentionally played the role of organizer 
in the mould production system of the Yuyao Cluster51. They not only provided raw 
materials, machines, and information, but also set up the training center, QC 
standards, and the R&D institutions. Thus, a strong external linkage between the 
SMEs of the Yuyao Cluster and China’s various domestic institutions has been formed. 
 
                                                  
49 The information on trade fair is cited from Zhongguo qinggong moju wang (accessed 
January 17, 2007). 
50 The data on the number of members and information is cited from Gong and Wan 
(accessed January 17, 2007). 
51 Indeed, the managing committee itself called the second to seventh measures “five 
centers and one base.” They expected the Yuyao Market to work as a platform to 
stimulate the innovation in Yuyao’s mould industry. 
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Table 8 Division of Labor in the Yuyao Market 
Year Total no. of companies in 
the Yuyao Market 
No. of mould 
production companies
No. of mould processing 
companies 
2001 220 50 100 
2005 658 More than 100 More than 300 
Sources:  
Total no. of companies in the Yuyao Market: Same as Table 7; 
No. of mould production and processing companies in 2001: Shao and Ding (accessed 
January 17, 2006); 
No. of mould production and processing companies in 2005: Interview with the vice 
president of moulds association of Yuyao in July 2006. 
 
As Table 8 indicates, this intervention resulted in a deeper division of labor in the 
Yuyao Market. During the period from 2001 to 2005, the number of mould production 
companies more than doubled. At the same time, the number of mould processing 
companies increased by more than a factor of three. It can be estimated that the 
number of companies of other types increased as well. Currently, the production of 
moulds in Yuyao Market is divided into design, software development, wire cutting, 
NC line, tools, parts, and so on. Each manufacturing process is taken care of by 
specialized companies. 
The deepening of the division of labor directly caused a lower production cost. It was 
said that the mould prices in Yuyao were only one third of those in Japan and half of 
those in Guangdong province in 2002. The difference in estimated prices between the 
companies in Yuyao Market in this year is not outside the scope of 10-15%52. It is clear 
that the local government has instructed the SMEs of the Yiwu cluster in a different 
way to survive price competition. 
 
                                                  
52 The information on mould prices in Yuyao is cited from China Moulds Net (accessed 
January 18, 2006). 
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6. Conclusion  
China’s huge domestic market is constantly expanding, and is low-end demand 
oriented and highly dispersed. It is taken for granted that under these market 
conditions, price competition will more easily occur than qualitative upgrading. 
However, as described throughout this paper, the local public sector played a crucial 
role in upgrading industrial clusters within this market. 
The specialized market is an appropriate focal point in observing how the domestic 
market and the local pubic sector interacted. In contrast to the transaction markets in 
other developing countries, the specialized markets developed with the industrial 
clusters simultaneously. A large number of important actors take part in the business 
of the specialized markets, including small producers, small buyers, and public 
sector-controlled managing committees. Specialized markets can be treated as a 
microcosm for China’s domestic market. 
By analyzing how the managing committees supported SMEs in upgrading in the 
specialized markets, we can arrive at the following conclusions: 
Firstly, China’s domestic market is not only very large, but also has surprising 
variety, especially in the daily necessities industries. For industrial clusters, this 
means SMEs must be able to treat the commodities as diverse as they can. However, 
too many types of commodities concentrated in a confined space will usually cause a 
chaotic environment that can hurt the efficiency of transaction. Under these 
circumstances, as the Yiwu case showed, only the local public sector had the ability to 
solve the problem. The AIC, as a member of the managing committee of the Yiwu 
market, has worked out a plan named Hua Hang Gui Shi, namely classifying a large 
number and type of commodities by industry and location. In spite of the strong 
resistance from booth keepers, they successfully carried this method out. Consequently, 
the competition between the booth keepers became even stronger, and every booth 
keeper was forced to specialize. This stimulated the further development of the market. 
As a result, at least eight huge industrial clusters have formed within Yiwu. 
Secondly, the majority of China’s domestic market is composed of members of the 
lower class, to whom price is usually thought to be more important than other factors. 
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However, the consumers in this market are also sensitive to the qualities of some 
products that affect one’s health. As the same time, they can make their requirements 
for quality known through the Zhongguo Zhiliang Wanlixing. As the Danyang’s case 
indicated, in China, the local public sector was extremely sensitive to the great 
pressure derived from this social movement. Thus, they had to attempt every means 
available in order to help the booth keepers improve their QC. This not only led to 
progress in the quality of eyewear, but also raised the share of local products in the 
Danyang Market, consequently upgrading the whole industrial cluster.  
Thirdly, China’s domestic market is more price-oriented than technology or 
quality-oriented, especially in supporting industries such as moulds. Usually, this 
characteristic will become an obstacle for the upgrading of industrial clusters. However, 
the Yuyao case suggests that price-oriented markets can also stimulate the 
improvement of the production system. In Yuyao, local government was the only actor 
who has both the ability and the incentive to carry it out. They have established the 
Yuyao Market, and intentionally asked the managing committee for this market to 
play the role of organizer in providing raw materials, skilled workers and promoting 
R&D. As a result, the division of labor in the Yuyao Market became deeper and deeper, 
which established the cost advantage of the Yuyao moulds industry. 
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